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Funding the Life of Brian: Jobseekers, Welfare
Shopping and the Frontiers of European
Citizenship
ECJ, Judgment of 23 March 2004, Case C-138/02,
Brian Francis Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, n.y.r.
By Jochen Meulman and Henri de Waele*
1. Introduction
In a string of recent cases, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has quite
rapidly put flesh on the bones of European citizenship. Article 17 EC confers
that status upon ‘Every person holding the nationality of a Member State
[…].’ One important right enjoyed by citizens of the Union is enshrined in
Article 12 EC, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality. The
still embryonic case law is now slowly maturing, and as a result the concept of
citizenship is taking shape and the rights associated with it are becoming more
and more visible.
It is perhaps noteworthy to recall that for some time, expectations about
the practical value of European Union (EU) citizenship were low. At the
outset, scholarship tended to regard European citizenship as an empty shell, a
notion devoid of legal meaning or significance: in effect, a new garment sewn
for a non-existing Emperor.1 It was nevertheless clear that its introduction
could provoke legal impact if the ECJ were inclined to take a favourable
stance. The ECJ then, after initially having dodged2 or repudiated3 questions
on the exact scope and consequences of the new Treaty Articles, opened the
* Department of European Law, University of Nijmegen.
1. See inter alia J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do The New Clothes Have An Emperor?,
Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 324 ff.; J. Shaw, ‘The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizen-
ship in the European Union’ (1997) 22 ELRev. 554. Excellent testimony also offers e.g. H.U.
Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential’, in R. Dehousse (ed.),
Europe after Maaastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (Deventer, Kluwer 1994), p. 147: ‘Citizenship is
[…] nearly exclusively a symbolic plaything without substantive content’.
2. See Case C-378/97, Criminal proceedings against Florus Ariël Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207.
3. See Joined cases C-64/96 & 65/96, Land-Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet v. Land
Nordhrhein-Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-3171.
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floodgates at the end of the 1990’s with its Sala judgment.4 In particular, the
rights of the not economically active have since been progressively developed.
A quick glance at recent case law reveals that persons who are not employed,
due to the newly inserted provisions on citizenship, now enjoy the right:
– of equal treatment as regards conditions for access to child-raising allow-
ance, provided that its beneficiary has been lawfully resident in the recipi-
ent state for a notable period of time (Martínez Sala5);
– to remain in the Member State in which they have ceased to be economi-
cally active, even though their health insurance does not cover emergency
treatment in that state (Baumbast6);
– to a ‘tideover allowance’ in the period between the completion of post-
secondary education and their first employment on non-discriminatory
terms (D’Hoop7);
– to temporary solidarity by means of access to minimum subsistence grants
on the same conditions as nationals of the recipient state, during their
final period of study and on the condition that they lawfully reside in the
recipient Member State, provided that they do not unreasonably burden
that state’s social security system (Grzelczyk8);
– to apply successfully for a change of surname of their minor children if
they possess dual nationality, and their home state entitles their children
to bear a different surname than the one they would normally have borne
under the law of the recipient Member State (Garcia Avello9);
– equal treatment in respect of the right to have criminal proceedings insti-
tuted against them conducted in a language that is not the principle
language of the recipient Member State (Bickel and Franz10).
All these cases have created a notable stir, mainly because they are products of
judicial activism. The scope of the free movement of persons has been
stretched by including those who ‘merely’ enjoy the status of citizen of the
Union whereas classic case law on the free movement of persons focused on
the economically active. However, in its previous judgments, the ECJ seemed
4. Case C-85/96, María Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691.
5. Ibid.
6. Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] ECR I-
7091.
7. Case C-224/98, Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v. Office nationale de l’emploi, [2002] ECR I-6191.
8. Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve,
[2001] ECR I-6193.
9. Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, judgment of 2 October 2003, n.y.r.
10. Case C-274/96, Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz, [1998] ECR I-
7637.
Funding the Life of Brian
277
somewhat one-sided in its approach, focusing on the expansion of the notion of
citizenship and the interpretation of the rights attached. Collins adds new
perspectives to the debate by focusing on public interest concerns of Member
States, which may limit these rights. As always in the context of negative
integration, the progressive dismantling of barriers to free movement fosters
the debate on the boundaries of movement rights. Although the ECJ addressed
possible justifications for remaining barriers in obiter in the case of D’Hoop,
successful appeals to public policy defences had so far not been made.11 The
Collins judgment provides insights as to which restrictions on free movement
rights Member States are still permitted to impose when they wish to delimit
the exercise of rights based on Article 17 in combination with the non-dis-
crimination clause in Article 12 EC. The ECJ once again resorts to its vested
principle that restrictions on the fundamental freedoms may be imposed if
they are ‘[…] based on objective considerations that are independent of the
nationality of the persons concerned and proportionate to the legitimate aim
of the national provisions.’12 With this observation, the application of what is
better known as the mandatory requirements doctrine also appears to have
gained definitive foothold in the field of citizenship rights.
Collins does leave certain important questions unanswered, however. Un-
certainty remains regarding the ground and intensity with which Member
States are still allowed to protect their national interests.
Apart from the issue of citizenship, the case also sheds light upon the
notion of ‘worker’, employed, inter alia, in Article 39 EC, Regulation (EEC)
No.1612/6813 and Directive 68/360/EEC.14 Regarding this notion, Collins
appears to overrule the Lebon judgment15 at least partially. In that judgment of
1987, the Court crafted a shrewd distinction between workers entitled to the
full range of rights conferred by EC law, including access to social benefits,
and those who move in search of employment and only benefit from the
11. In various Opinions of Advocates General the issue was explored in considerable detail already.
See inter alia AG Cosmas in Wijsenbeek; AG Jacobs in Bickel and Franz and Garcia Avello; AG
Geelhoed in Case C-413/01, Franca Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr
und Kunst, Judgment of 6 November 2003, n.y.r.
12. Collins, para. 66. Although the ECJ finally awards an appeal to the mandatory requirements
doctrine in the citizenship context in Collins, the issue featured of course prominently in the less
successful attempt in D’Hoop (para. 39).
13. Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for
workers within the Community, OJ (1968) L257/2, as amended, hereinafter: Regulation 1612/
68.
14. Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on move-
ment and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families, OJ
(1968) L257/13, hereinafter: Directive 68/360.
15. Case 316/85, Centre public d’aide sociale de Courcelles v. Marie-Christine Lebon, [1987] ECR
2811.
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principle of equal treatment outside the realm of social and tax advantages.
Here, too, additional pieces of the puzzle have yet to slide into place.
2. Facts
The facts underlying the present case are relatively straightforward. Mr. Brian
Francis Collins is a United States (US) citizen who possesses both US and Irish
nationality.16 His past connections with the EU have been rather weak: he
studied in the United Kingdom (UK) during one semester in 1978. He re-
turned home, but came back to the UK to work part-time for a period of ten
months in 1980-1981. He subsequently returned to the US and worked there,
as well as in Africa. He left the US for the UK again in 1998, this time with a
view to finding employment there. Within eight days after his arrival, he
claimed a ‘jobseeker’s allowance’, a social benefit available to people in search
of work, under the Jobseekers Act 1995 and the Jobseeker’s Allowance Regu-
lation 1996. The competent authorities refused to grant Mr. Collins a
jobseeker’s allowance on the ground that he was not habitually resident in the
UK, a prerequisite for eligibility to this non-contributory social security ben-
efit. Mr. Collins filed appeal against this decision with a Social Security Appeal
Tribunal, which upheld the initial decision. It argued that Mr. Collins was not
habitually resident in the UK because, first of all, he had not been resident for
an appreciable time,17 and he was not a worker in the meaning of Regulation
1612/68 and, furthermore, that he did not fall within the scope of Directive
68/360 which grants residence rights to Community workers.
Mr. Collins appealed again, this time to the Social Security Commissioner.
The latter referred three questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The
national court asked guidance concerning the question of whether persons in
Mr. Collins’ situation qualify as a worker for the purposes of Regulation 1612/
68, and second, in case the answer to the first question were in the negative,
whether the claimant would have a right to reside in the UK pursuant to
Directive 68/360. Regulation 85 (4) of the 1996 Jobseeker’s Allowance Regu-
16. Mr. Collins had no actual links with Ireland, other than his nationality and the fact that he
visited the country on three occasions, but never longer than ten days consecutively. In the
words of AG Colomer, however: ‘[…] it is of little matter […], that, as a United States citizen,
he also acquired Irish nationality, never having lived nor worked in Ireland; that he can only
claim to have worked in one of the States of the European Union; and that it has been 17 years
since he lived or pursued any activity in the United Kingdom, where he is intending to seek
employment’. The mere fact that Mr. Collins possesses the nationality of a Member State brings
him within the scope of Community law. See Case C-369/90, Mario Vicente Micheletti and
others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239.
17. The required duration of residence is not specified further: cf. Opinion of AG Colomer, foot-
note 32.
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lation expressly refers to these two Community law measures; persons who fall
within their scope are eligible for a jobseeker’s allowance on the same terms as
claimants who are habitually resident in the UK.18 The national court could
have left it to these two questions, but cleverly proceeded to ask if, in case the
answer to the second question were also not in the affirmative, there were ‘any
other provisions or principles of European Community law [that] require the
payment of a social security benefit with conditions of entitlement like those
for income-based jobseeker’s allowance to a person in the circumstances of the
claimant in the present case’.19
3. The judgment
3.1. The first question
The ECJ starts off answering the first question by reiterating that the notion of
‘worker’ should be broadly interpreted.20 It includes those who have had an
employment relationship in a Member State in the past but have subsequently
lost their job, provided that there is a link between the previous employment
and their later search for work. According to the ECJ, the application of this
rule to Mr. Collins’ case leads to the conclusion that a link between his brief
employment in the EU in 1980-81, and his search for work seventeen years
later is insufficient for him to qualify as worker in the broader sense of the
notion. Mr. Collins does satisfy the definition of work-seeker, but that does not
entitle him to receive the benefits stipulated in Article 7 (2) of Regulation
1612/68. On this point the ECJ refers to its earlier case law in Lebon and
Commission v. Belgium,21 holding that: ‘The concept of ‘worker’ is […] not
used in Regulation No 1612/68 in a uniform manner. While in Title II of Part
I of the Regulation this term covers only persons who have already entered the
employment market, in other parts of the same regulation the concept of
‘worker’ must be understood in a broader sense.’22 This means that only those
who are or have been employed can exercise their rights to social and tax
advantages under Article 7(2)23 of Regulation 1612/68; those who move in
18. The Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulation does also refer to Regulation 1251/70 and Directive 73/
148/EEC, but these can be considered inapplicable here. See, however, footnote 29 of the
Opinion of AG Colomer.
19. Collins, para. 20.
20. With reference to Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691,
para. 32.
21. Case C-278/94, Commission v. Belgium, [1996] ECR I-4307.
22. Collins, para. 32.
23. Which can be found in the second title of the first part of Regulation 1612/68.
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search for work can only benefit from equal treatment regarding access to
employment. Since Mr. Collins is treated as a person seeking first employment
in another Member State, given that the link with his previous employment in
the EU is so weak that it is deemed non-existent, Regulation 1612/68 leaves
him empty-handed. Nevertheless, the ECJ does not close the door on him
entirely, suggesting that the national judge determine whether the notion of
worker as used in the relevant UK legislation, is congruent with the terms of
Regulation 1612/68. Apparently, it leaves open the possibility that that notion
has a broader meaning under the Jobseekers Act, i.e. that it includes work-
seekers.
3.2. The second question
The second question concerns the applicant’s possibility to derive a right of
residence from Directive 68/360. It is remarkable that the ECJ begins its
answer by establishing the applicant’s right to free movement, this issue not
having been raised by the national court. With reference to Tsiotras,24 which
confirms that Article 39 (ex 48) of the EC Treaty grants residence rights to
persons who seek paid employment, the ECJ concludes that the applicant’s
residence right stems from the Treaty, rather than secondary legislation. By
contrast, Advocate General Colomer had clung to a more orthodox scenario,
discussed secondary law first and only then sought recourse to ‘catch-all provi-
sions’ of primary EC law. The ECJ seems to stray from this path, possibly
because it helps to illustrate that the division between the rights of workers and
work-seekers maintained in Regulation 1612/68, is also to be read in Directive
68/360. Its Articles 1-3 facilitate the free movement of workers as well as
work-seekers. However, the fact that Article 4 of the Directive grants residence
rights to Community workers on two conditions, the possession of a valid
residence permit and, moreover, the worker being able to produce a document
in which an employer in the recipient State confirms that the holder of that
document is or will be engaging in active employment, leads the ECJ to the
conclusion that this provision only extends to people who have successfully
applied for a job. This conclusion is strengthened by Article 8 of the Directive,
which provides an exhaustive list of circumstances in which residence rights
may be recognized without the worker possessing a residence permit, but not
without the employer’s declaration. Since the applicant cannot produce a
document stating that he will certainly be employed in the recipient Member
State, he does not enjoy a right to stay in the UK on the basis of Directive 68/
360, but derives his right of residence directly from Article 39 EC.25
24. Case C-171/91, Dimitrios Tsiotras v. Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, [1993] ECR I-2925.
25. At least, this implicit assumption appears to be present in remainder of the judgment. AG
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3.3. The third question
When turning to the, perhaps somewhat uncomfortably broad, but
precautiously framed third question, the ECJ therefore starts from the premise
that Mr. Collins legally resides in the UK. In light of Sala this is an important
point of departure since: ‘[…] a citizen of the European Union […], lawfully
resident in the territory of the host Member State, can rely on Article [12] of
the Treaty in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of
Community law […].’26 Following Grzelczyk, this may imply that the UK
accept: ‘[…] a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host
Member State and nationals of other Member States, particularly if the diffi-
culties which a beneficiary of the right of residence encounters are tempo-
rary.’27 Before the citizenship provisions, the basis for the award of Mrs. Sala’s
and Mr. Grzelczyk’s claims, are addressed, however, the ECJ attempts to apply
Regulation 1408/71 and concludes that the applicant cannot benefit from its
Article 10a.28
Since no other secondary law measures appear to be applicable, the ECJ
decides that the issue can only be resolved on the basis of the principle of equal
treatment expressed in Articles 12 EC and 39 (2) EC. With reference to
Antonissen,29 it reiterates that Collins, being a work-seeker, falls under the
terms of the first paragraph of Article 39 (1) EC and, therefore, enjoys the
right to equal treatment laid down in its second paragraph. However, even
though the principle of non discrimination in Article 39 (2) EC is applicable,
applicant’s rights to receive benefits are obstructed by Lebon, in which the ECJ
explicitly held that the right to equal treatment only extends to access to
employment, not to access to financial benefits. Nevertheless, the ECJ examines
whether the more general principle of non-discrimination, laid down in Article
12 EC, may fill the void Lebon left in Article 39 (2) EC in relation to work-
seekers. It thus attempts to re-establish the scope ratione materiae of Article 39
EC in view of recent developments in its case-law, in particular Grzelczyk. A
clear parallel with that case is that the Belgian ‘minimex’, which Mr. Grzelczyk
applied for, was also non-contributory, as is the UK jobseeker’s allowance.
Colomer was more explicit in his Opinion, ascribing Mr. Collins’ residence rights directly to
Antonissen (infra, note 29).
26. Sala, para. 63.
27. Grzelczyk, para. 44.
28. That provision prescribes that if entitlement to benefits is made dependent on completion of
periods of employment, self-employment or residence, completion of such periods in other
Member States than the recipient should be taken into account. Since Mr. Collins has not
resided, let alone worked, in any Member State, Article 10a is not applicable.
29. Case C-292/89, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Desiderius Anto-
nissen, [1991] ECR I-745.
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Consequently, according to the ECJ, the principle of non-discrimination also
extends to the latter kind of benefit.
In principle, no condition discriminating nationals of other Member States
can be imposed for access to non-contributory allowances. However, the ECJ
explicitly rules in paragraph 63 that only the grant of benefits that ‘facilitate
access to employment’ cannot be made conditional upon the satisfaction of
discriminatory criteria. This restriction is repeated in paragraph 64, in which
Lebon is partially overruled: benefits that are somehow connected with ‘access
to employment’ now come under the scope of Article 39 (2) EC in combina-
tion with Article 12 EC. Lebon is apparently not overruled entirely, because, in
a strict reading of that case, jobseekers would not be able to claim equal
treatment as regards social benefits since they would not qualify under part II
of Regulation 1612/68. This reading must be adjusted as follows: Article 7 (2)
of Regulation 1612/68 is split up into benefits that relate to access to employ-
ment (no discrimination) and other social and financial benefits (no right to
equal treatment as yet).
Since the 1996 Jobseeker’s Regulation bases the distinction between the
eligible and the non- eligible on a habitual residence test, it is classified as an
indistinctly applicable measure; it is clearly more difficult for non-nationals to
pass it than for UK subjects. The ECJ already held in D’Hoop30 and Bickel and
Franz31 that a measure of this type can be justified only: ‘[…] if it is based on
objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons con-
cerned and is proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions
[…].’ It had also ruled that it is legitimate for national legislators to ensure that
there is a genuine link between the beneficiary of a social security benefit and
the geographic employment market.32
The important addition in Collins is that for jobseekers the existence of
such a link can be established by determining whether the person concerned
has in fact genuinely sought work in the recipient Member State. In this
respect, a residence requirement is deemed appropriate for ensuring a connec-
tion between the work-seeker and the domestic employment market. More-
over, regarding proportionality sensu stricto, the ECJ attaches important condi-
tions to the validity of the UK’s public policy defence. In a general fashion, the
application of the residence criterion must ‘[…] rest on clear criteria known in
advance and provision must be made for a means of legal redress of a judicial
nature.’33 Of particular interest is the third and more detailed condition that:
‘[…] if compliance with the requirement demands a period of residence, the
30. D’Hoop, para. 36.
31. Bickel and Franz was somewhat less instructive on this point because there (para. 27), the path
to Article 12 EC was cleared by following Article 49 EC.
32. D’Hoop, para 38.
33. Collins, para. 72.
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period must not exceed what is necessary in order for the national authorities
to satisfy themselves that the person concerned is genuinely seeking work in
the employment market of the host Member State.’34 The effective search for
a job thus establishes a sufficient link between a work-seeker and a geographic
employment market. The existence of such a link demands that Member
States respect the principle of equal treatment in the context of social benefits
which intent to facilitate access to employment.
4. Commentary
4.1. The notion of worker; the rights of work-seekers
The first interesting aspect of Collins is that it sheds additional light on the
notion of worker in EC law: an indication is given concerning its ‘expiry date’.
The ECJ had already ruled in Sala that: ‘Once the employment relationship
has ended, the person concerned as a rule loses his status of worker […],’ but
it immediately added that: ‘[…] that status may produce certain effects after
the relationship has ended, and a person who is genuinely seeking work must
also be classified as a worker.’35 It is now clear that that status cannot be
retained indefinitely; the Advocate General and the ECJ agree on this point,
and both conclude that the 17-year interval between Mr. Collins’ last effective
employment in the EC and his renewed search for a job in 1998 is too long for
him still to be considered a worker. This is, of course, not an exact refinement,
but it nonetheless offers some guidance for the future.
The expansion of the rights of Community work-seekers to include access
to certain financial benefits on equal terms as Member State nationals is a
second novelty. Some authors had already concluded that earlier judgments
had torn down this wall. Indeed, a broad reading of Sala seems to suggest that
anyone who lawfully resides in the territory of another Member State has
access to social benefits on equal footing with nationals of that state. This
would largely overrule Lebon, in which a separation between the rights of
work-seekers and workers was made, along the somehow fictitious line drawn
between Parts I and II of the first Title of Regulation 1612/68. In 1999,
O’Leary even argued that the division between workers and the not-economi-
cally active was erased either by Sala, or, in relation to jobseekers, possibly
earlier, by Antonissen.36 In retrospect, these conclusions have been somewhat
34. Ibid.
35. Sala, para. 32: In retuning of Case 66/85, Deborah Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg,
[1986] ECR 2121, and Case 39/86, Sylvie Lair v. Universität Hannover, [1988] ECR 3161.
36. S. O’Leary, ‘Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship,’ (1999) 24 ELRev. 68,
76.
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premature. Collins provides at least two important indications that a narrow
view on the rights of the not-economically active is the more apposite. First,
there is the limitation in paras. 63-64 of the judgment:
‘63 In view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the
interpretation in the case-law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by
citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope
of Article [39] (2) of the Treaty – which expresses the fundamental
principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article [12] of the Treaty – a
benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment
in the labour market of a Member State.
64 The interpretation of the scope of the principle of equal treatment in
relation to access to employment must reflect this development, as com-
pared with the interpretation followed in Lebon and in Case C-278/94
Commission v Belgium.’
The ECJ explicitly narrows down its ruling to a benefit of a specific nature and
then confirms that Lebon is only overruled in regard to that type of benefit.
The demarcation line in Regulation 1612/68 has shifted and now appears to
run through Article 7 (2) rather than between its Articles 6 and 7. Only those
benefits that intend to facilitate access to employment are included in the
package of rights enjoyed by those in search for employment.37 Which benefits
are included in the identified category remains opaque: do financial benefits in
general facilitate finding a job, other than through providing the recipient with
the financial means to reside within the host Member State? Moreover: do all
Member States have social security schemes of the type of the jobseekers allow-
ance?38
A second indication, which underscores the limited impact of Sala, is pro-
vided by Advocate General Colomer in Collins. He distinguishes the latter case
by explicitly contending that the passage, which supports a broad reading of
the former case, should not be taken out of its context.39 He identifies no less
37. In that respect, the position of Jacqueson has been somewhat rash: ‘ […] it seems that as long as
they are lawfully residing in the host state, they can claim all advantages granted to the workers
granted by Community law, relying either on their status as a worker […] or, at least, on their
status as citizens of the Union according to the Sala ruling’” C. Jacqueson, ‘Union citizenship
and the Court of Justice: Something new under the sun? Towards social citizenship.’ (2002) 27
ELRev. 260, 277.
38. The difficulties that could arise will no doubt be similar to the problems the Raulin case posed
for Dutch student allowances, where the basic grant could not be split according to the various
cost elements. See Case C-357/89, V.J.M. Raulin v. Minister voor Onderwijs en Wetenschappen,
[1992] ECR I-1027, paras. 26 and 27. After Collins, a similar artificial distinction between the
access-related components and the remaining ones could prove hard to construct for Member
States.
39. Collins, Opinion of AG Colomer, para. 65.
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than five conditions that render Sala context-specific. The ECJ does not copy
these but does appear to follow the spirit of the Opinion by supporting a
restrictive approach to the citizenship provisions here, probably because of
their still residual character. Nevertheless, one should be cautious in stating
that the impact of Collins is limited. The reasoning behind the judgment is
potentially explosive: lavishly awarding non-discrimination claims to the ben-
efit of the economically inactive may put severe strain on national social secu-
rity systems. It is therefore remarkable that the ECJ does not analogously apply
the two limiting principles recognized in Grzelczyk; the temporal nature of
solidarity and the possibility that the recipient of a benefit may become an
unreasonable burden on the finances of the host Member State.40
4.2. Mandatory requirements in citizenship
Collins definitively confirms the applicability of the ‘rule of reason’ in the
context of Article 12 EC.41 Thus, rather than putting flesh on the bones of
Community citizenship, the case removes a rib and hands it back to Member
States. The ECJ thus awards them discretion to pursue their policy objectives,
yet articulates the parameters itself. Since appeals to the rule of reason had so
far systematically failed, this was work cut out already. After all, in citizenship
cases, the rules employed by Member States to protect their national interests
had hitherto either been discriminatory in the formal sense, or the connecting
factor opted for still contained covert elements that almost amounted to for-
mal discrimination.42 It has now become clear that appeals to profoundly non-
discriminatory criteria will stand the test and that, therefore, requirements apt
for establishing a genuine link between the geographic labour market and the
individual concerned are lawful in principle.43 A demand that certain periods
of residence have been completed is well suited in this respect.44 Nevertheless,
such periods must be restricted to what is absolutely necessary for attainment
40. Albeit established in the context of Directive 93/96 and in light of the ‘[…] specific characteris-
tics of students’ residence.’ See Grzelczyk, para. 44.
41. The mandatory requirements test is confirmed and constructed in Collins (para. 66) with refer-
ence to Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, para. 27 (which itself was based on Case C-15/96,
Schöning-Kougebetopoulou, para. 21, which in turn relied on Case C-237/94, O’Flynn) and fol-
lows the familiar reasoning that these ‘can be justified only if [they are] based on objective
considerations that are independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and proportion-
ate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions.’
42. Formal discrimination: Grzelczyk, Bickel and Franz; less direct, but touching upon formal dis-
crimination: D’Hoop. Cf. C. Barnard, The substantive law of the EU: The four freedoms, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 418–9.
43. As was already advocated by AG Geelhoed in his Opinion in Ninni-Orasche, para. 96.
44. Collins, paras. 47 and 69.
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45. These require the claimant to be available for and actively seeking employment and not to have
income exceeding the applicable amount or capital exceeding a specified amount; Collins, para.
68.
46. Collins, Opinion of AG Colomer, footnote 4.
47. See Barnard (supra, note 42), p. 414 (original emphasis).
of the objective, which in the vast majority of cases will be the financial
balance of the benefit scheme at hand. For Mr. Collins this obviously means
that the UK has the right to verify whether he lawfully resides within its
territory. As soon as he does and he fulfils the other criteria for eligibility,45 he
cannot be refused a jobseeker’s allowance.
The financial consequences of the ruling may be quite significant, as from
the Opinion of Advocate General Colomer it is apparent that the jobseekers
allowance can be attributed for an indefinite period, at least until the jobseeker
is actually employed.46 This means that the only period during which an
allowance can be refused is the period needed for the UK authorities to check
whether a jobseeker is genuinely seeking paid employment, i.e. whether he is
available and actively looking for work. The natural corollary is then the
assimilation of his situation with a national who is habitually resident in the
host Member State. The only reason why a benefit related to access to employ-
ment such as the jobseeker’s allowance can be refused, would be the proven
fact that the person concerned had not been actively looking for work within
and after this period. But then this itself can only be established after this
period, in which he possibly had already been receiving the allowance under
the presumption of qualifying as one genuinely seeking employment. If one
assumes that the status of work-seeker can be verified retroactively, then the
benefit could also be claimed retroactively from either the moment of entry, or
from the moment it has become clear to the national authorities that the
entrant has become a work-seeker, dependent on the national criteria.
Extrapolation of the principle of non-discrimination may lead one to con-
clude that migrant work-seekers will never become more of a burden on a
social security system than nationals of the host state. It remains to be seen
then whether the limiting principles of Grzelczyk would not apply, i.e. whether
transnational solidarity to the advantage of jobseekers can find its borders in
any timeframe. Whether, in the words of Barnard, taking her cue from
Grzelczyk, national taxpayers pay their taxes to help provide benefits for their
fellow nationals in need and for migrant EU citizens who are in temporary
need.47 Rather than lending force to this presumption, Collins exhibits a Janus-
like quality here. Member States, after having been given discretion in D’Hoop,
now have guidance on when and how to invoke the mandatory requirements
doctrine in the citizenship context. At the same time, however, their most
important weapon, a distinctly applicable temporal cap on the award of the
relevant benefit, is disarmed.
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4.3. Welfare shopping after Collins: prospectives
Taken in general perspective, Collins explores the frontiers of welfare shopping,
although Member States’ fear of social tourism is far from omnipresent in the
judgment itself. Only the German and UK governments proceeded to inter-
vene. Moreover and quite surprisingly, it is the Commission who brought
forward the term ‘benefit tourism’, showing no hesitance to touch the true sore
spot. The ECJ seems not to pay much regard to the possible explosive content
of its ruling, tailoring the outcome to the facts of the case. But it is this
ongoing inattention for the broader picture that may become worrying as the
ECJ continues to be reluctant to assess the potential cumulative effect of many
such individual cases.48 Even though the ‘unreasonable financial burden’ is
implicitly avoided in the present case, multiple Mr.’s Collins genuinely seeking
employment may well draw heavily on the resources of at least certain benefit
schemes. It is left to Member States to either scale down their the welfare sums
in height or duration, or to put the tools handed down by the ECJ to good
use, and pursue social security policy that can meet the challenges of citizen-
ship. It is soothing to know that in the case of Mr. Collins, the genuine nature
of his search for work was not in dispute, as ‘it appears that he had remained
continuously employed in the United Kingdom ever since first finding work
there shortly after his arrival.’49 But future concerns do remain legitimate as
the ECJ’s reasoning does indeed not accommodate the potential of cumulative,
less meritorious claims.
The new Citizenship Directive will not immediately affect the situation of
persons in the circumstances of the case under review. It leaves the position of
jobseekers largely untouched, especially since Regulation 1612/68 is not re-
pealed upon its entry into force.50 Thus, the thrust of the Lebon case law,
together with the recent expansion of its content by Collins, remains forceful.
The political institutions have sought to curtail some of the recent judicial
activism by proposing that equal treatment will no longer extend to social
assistance for migrant students, a retrogression in respect to Grzelczyk.51
48. ‘It may well be true that the double bill arising from one Baumbast and one Grzelczyk cannot
really constitute an unreasonable burden upon the public purse – but ten-thousand Baumbasts
and ten-thousand Grzelczyks might well have some more appreciable effect on the welfare
resources of the host state.’ M. Dougan and E. Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the (non-)
English Patient: A double-bill on residency rights under Article 18 EC,’ (2003) 28 ELRev. 699,
707.
49. Collins, para. 50.
50. Article 35 of the proposal for a Directive on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM (2003) 199
fin. (Approved without amendment by EP on 10 March 2004) only deletes Articles 10 and 11
from Regulation 1612/68.
51. Ibid., Article 21. Interestingly, it originally also excluded entitlement to social assistance for
persons other than those engaging in gainful activity in an employed or self-employed capacity
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until they had acquired a permanent right of residence (i.e. after four years). Parliament rejected
this proposed exclusion.
52. Case C-224/02, Heikki Antero Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö, judgment of 29
April 2004, n.y.r., in which an appeal to the mandatory requirements doctrine in respect to the
Finnish tax system was largely upheld.
53. Case C-95/03, Vincenzo Piliego v. OCMW (pending), in which a Belgian judge asks whether the
provisions on citizenship should be interpreted such that a citizen of the Union, lawfully resid-
ing in the territory of another Member State, should receive social welfare under the same
conditions as nationals of the host state, despite generally restrictive national rules.
Whether the ECJ will concede to this encapsulation and smother the vanguard
of its quiet revolution is uncertain. Who will assume power? Harbinger for the
future may be Pusa,52 possible headsman Piliego.53
